It is probably fair to say that most intelligence professionals view the intelligence cycle as central to their work, and as a consequence, the ‘cycle’ is the subject of much discussion as it will be the lynchpin to most complex intelligence operations. Such debate should be viewed as a good thing, constantly challenging us to review assumptions and processes.
The four central themes (at least in the UK) of direction, collection, processing and dissemination attract much attention. Perhaps this is partly due to the inadequacy of one word to encapsulate the intelligence functions contained within each phase. For me, seeing myself primarily as an analyst, the processing segment causes me the most concerns. This is where the bulk of the analytical brain power is concentrated, but processing, as a term, just cannot take into account all that I want it to, and I am always left seeking a better description to capture all of the many techniques and thought processes applied just in this phase.
Of course, depending on your centre of gravity, you will see the intelligence cycle from different angles, for example it is likely an intelligence collector will argue that the collection function is the most important, the decision-maker will tend towards direction and the customers to dissemination. I think all of that is natural as we feel keenest those subjects most affecting us.
Nobody is wrong or right in this discussion, what matters is that we continue to have an exchange of views on the intelligence cycle so that it remains pertinent to our operations. And that includes all of the sub-functions contained within each phase of the cycle. Debate is such an important element of intelligence work that, I would argue, it not only drives the development of our doctrine, but also is the key aspect of operational success.
Now, it is fair to say, there is a significant body of specialists within the intelligence community to whom the Intelligence Cycle is not relevant on a day-to-day basis. They operate without reference to the ‘cycle’, in some cases not even knowing of its existence. I struggle to maintain a balanced stance on this issue, as my experience suggests that no alternative methodology is in use by these people. The onus seems to be placed on their, often highly talented, individuals to be able to draw all the many threads together in a coherent way. This is a flawed approach, I believe, often leading to an erratic work flow and a lack of an audit trail with a tendency to produce backward-facing assessments explaining what happened yesterday, rather than predicting what will be happening tomorrow.
Organisations and individuals can also think they only conduct a single specialised intelligence function without reference to the remainder of the Intelligence Cycle. This seems to imply a fundamental lack of understanding that intelligence is distinct from information. Again, this represents a real danger of such efforts being taken out of context with the overall intelligence picture. How often is information fed directly to the decision-makers, no doubt with the justification that the information in question is urgent and relevant to a pending decision? However, it still needs to be presented in perspective with other information or intelligence.
An ongoing debate on the Intelligence Cycle is surely a desirable thing, perhaps particularly to draw in some of the intelligence community to highlight the benefits of such an approach. But should everyone have an equal say here? We would like to attract informed and relevant input, but we suffer more than most disciplines from professional amateurs – everyone can do intelligence it seems, although apparently the same is not true of sales, marketing or operations. Is not our toughest role convincing the decision-makers to accept our assessment rather than the view obtained from the newspaper this morning on the train to work?
At the heart of this is the “Information versus intelligence” issue. The key function of the intelligence cycle is to transform information into quantified, actionable intelligence. This transformation is the primary role of the intelligence analyst and only occurs towards the end of the processing phase (see the diagram below). Therefore, by definition, everything before this point in the Intelligence Cycle is information, including what was in the newspaper this morning, alongside all of that secret reporting from your sources and agencies.
There is an old maxim that says “only mount an operation based on intelligence, never on information”. This is as true in the commercial world as it always was in military operations. Remember, that is what the Board is advocating if it wants to take action based on what was in this morning’s newspaper. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but you would need to be in desperate straits and to really understand the risks of your actions.
And for me this is the key point, the Intelligence Cycle definitively demonstrates the distinction between information and intelligence. The decision-maker can be shown this process to prove assessments have substance and that a transformation has taken place, whereby the resultant intelligence amounts to more than its constituent information parts.
Now for the analyst, the intelligence cycle may still have some limitations in terms of its ability to embrace all of our activities, but it is at least a robust tool to maintain some semblance of order when facing a complex intelligence operation.
Does that answer the question; is the intelligence cycle still relevant? Well I hope so – I would personally like there to be wider use of the Intelligence Cycle and for more debate on its structure and application.
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War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth
Major-General Carl von Clausewitz, On War 1832


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